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Ethical and Legal Implications 
Leslie P. Francis* 
The technology of genetic diagnosis, both in utero and after 
birth, is developing with breathtaking speed. It is already possible 
to diagnose prenatally such chromosomal abnormalities as trisomy 
13, 18 and 21 (the last is known as Down's syndrome) and such 
genetic diseases as Tay-Sachs and sickle cell anemia. Within the 
very near future, reliable prenatal testing will likely be available 
for such genetic diseases as cystic fibrosis! and Huntington's cho-
rea. In most cases, we will also be able to determine those individu-
als at risk of having offspring who suffer from these conditions, 
and further, those individuals who will develop later onset condi-
tions, if they have not done so already. Genetic therapy is also ap-
pearing as a realistic possibility, particularly for diseases such as 
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome that are caused by a deficiency in a single 
gene.2 These possibilities, developing every day, pose a number of 
ethical and legal problems for us both as individuals and as a soci-
ety. If for no other reason than the speed of technological develop-
ment, it is difficult for the law to keep pace. 
This Essay outlines some of the ethical complexities genetic 
technology poses in two areas of decisionmaking: when to perform 
genetic testing and what to do with the information gained from 
genetic testing. My discussion does not promise any answers but 
an overview of why the issues are so complex. 
A. The Decision to Perform Genetic Testing 
As with the decision to perform other forms of diagnostic test-
ing, the decision to perform genetic diagnosis involves a determina-
tion that medical intervention-albeit of a minimal diagnostic 
sort-is appropriate. Suppose we begin the search for criteria to 
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1. See, e.g., Newmark, Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 318 NATURE 309 (1985). 
2. See Areen, Regulating Human Gene Therapy, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 153, 159, n.32 
(1985). 
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guide such decisionmaking with the standard that is common to 
other decisions about diagnosis and treatment: test when the bene-
fits of testing outweigh the risks. This standard is complex enough 
in ordinary medical contexts. It involves at a minimum both physi-
ological and psychological judgments.3 In the context of genetic di-
agnosis this standard is particularly difficult, for a wide range of 
risks and benefits are involved for different people, including par-
ents, offspring and society. 
Consider first the case of prenatal testing through amni-
ocentesis for a genetic disease such as Tay-Sachs or a chromosomal 
abnormality such as Down's syndrome. There are minor physical 
risks to both mother and fetus from the test procedure itself. 
Amniocentesis poses a slight risk of infection and a one in 200-300 
risk of miscarriage. On the other side, however, there may be phys-
ical benefits for either mother or child in some cases in which pre-
natal diagnosis is possible. Treatment in utero of hydrocephalus, 
for example, may reduce neural damage. 
Other benefits of amniocentesis go beyond the merely physi-
cal. The parents may benefit from knowing whether the fetus is 
afHicted by being relieved of worry or by being able to adjust to the 
coming birth of an impaired infant. They will also be able to de-
cide on the basis of this prenatal test information whether to ter-
minate the pregnancy. In addition, the availability of such infor-
mation may clearly benefit the fetus. The fetus benefits if, for 
example, the mother would not have conceived the child, or would 
have terminated the pregnancy because of a genetic risk. 
If a method of genetic diagnosis is less than fully accurate, or 
is inaccurately performed, however, there are risks for both parent 
and child that a pregnancy will be terminated in the mistaken be-
lief that the fetus is affected. Most controversial of all are the pos-
sible consequences for the fetus of the mother's knowledge that the 
3. Courts in the United States have disagreed on the proper standard for informed 
consent by patients undergoing diagnostic procedures. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE 11 22.15-.65 (1985). The traditional standard is that the patient should be 
told about risks that the reasonable physician would disclose. Id. 11 22.06. This is still the 
rule in England and in many jurisdictions in the United States. Schwartz & Grubb, Why 
Britain Can't Afford Informed Consent, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Aug. 1985. at 19, 21-
22. Since the decision in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1064 (1972), however, an increasing number of jurisdictions in the United States have 
required disclosure of risks that the prudent patient would want to take into account in 
deciding whether to undergo a medical procedure. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra, 11 
22.08. How far disclosure of these risks should be extended in the interest of patient auton-
omy, however, remains controversial. See, e.g., Curran, Informed Consent in Malpractice 
Cases, 14 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 429, 429-31 (1986). 
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fetus is affected by a genetic or chromosomal condition. Some ar-
gue that abortion is a benefit to a fetus affected by a condition 
such as Tay-Sachs, who faces a short period of development fol-
lowed by potentially painful deterioration and death within two to 
five years. Others argue that it is not a benefit to a fetus afflicted 
with less severe or less rapidly fatal conditions such as Down's syn-
drome or Huntington's disease. Perhaps the most difficult of such 
choices involve conditions that permit the development of some 
years of meaningful life, coupled with suffering and early death. 
Cystic fibrosis is an example; many victims now survive until their 
late teens or early twenties, but must endure increasingly painful 
therapy and hospitalizations to preserve life. Still others argue, 
perhaps for religious reasons, that abortion is never a benefit to a 
fetus, no matter how grave the condition. 
Now consider the risks and benefits to an individual of knowl-
edge at any point before conception that he or she is at genetic risk 
of conceiving an afflicted child. One could argue on utilitarian 
grounds, or from the importance of preserving traditional familial 
institutions, that it is better to make decisions about marriage, 
procreation and other such basic life choices in blissful ignorance 
about genetic risks. If genetic diagnosis is not performed, some 
couples will encounter tragedies that they would prefer to have 
avoided, such as the birth of a doomed child. Others will know that 
they are at risk of tragedy because, for example, of other births or 
family events. They may as a result choose options (for example, 
remaining childless) they would not have chosen had genetic diag-
nosis been available. Still others may miss the possibility of thera-
peutic intervention, although this possibility is not available for 
currently untreatable genetic diseases such as Tay-Sachs. These 
risks are avoidable with genetic diagnosis. 
Other risks, however, may present themselves when diagnosis 
is performed. For example, knowledge about their genetic risks 
may be a source of unhappiness to people who possess it. It may 
devastate others close to those at risk. Marriages may founder, or 
engagements be broken. Further, insurance companies and em-
ployers may use information about genetic risk to the disadvantage 
of those screened. These nonphysical risks from genetic informa-
tion are serious indeed and will be discussed more fully in the sec-
tion below. 
The possibility of a mass screening program 'presents other 
nonphysical risks. Mass screening for sickle cell anemia, for exam-
ple, was tentatively introduced but met with outcries that it could 
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have racist overtones if it encouraged abortions among blacks:' 
The situation is complicated still further if we consider re-
search aimed at developing new methods of genetic diagnosis. 
Physical risks of such research to subjects may be slight or nonex-
istent. In the usual case, diagnostic research involves the use of 
blood or tissue samples obtained for other purposes. There may be 
benefits from the research for the experimental subject, such as the 
diagnosis and treatment of active disease. Concomitantly, experi-
mental diagnostic instruments risk inaccuracy; misinformation 
conveyed to subjects could be used in ways that are physically or 
psychologically damaging. For example, early efforts to develop a 
method of identifyinK carriers of cystic fibrosis raised high hopes of 
accuracy but proved disappointing.1I 
The risks and benefits of experimentation with genetic diagno-
sis also include, of course, the eventual development and use of the 
very tools of genetic diagnosis under experimental scrutiny. More-
over, experimentation may prove only a partial success. It may be 
possible, for example, to develop a test for the presence of active 
disease without being able to identify carriers or perform accurate 
prenatal diagnosis. Tests of carrier status may become available 
before tools for prenatal diagnosis. Individuals are then confronted 
with the knowledge that they are carriers, but that the condition of 
their particular unborn children cannot be ascertained. 
B. Information Obtained in Genetic Diagnosis 
The possibilities for use of information obtained in genetic di-
agnosis pose ethical dilemmas fully as troubling as the dilemmas 
posed by the decision to test. Genetic research generates these di-
lemmas most sharply, but they also appear in ordinary uses of ge-
netic diagnosis. 
First, conveying information to those being tested themselves 
poses both risks and benefits. The knowledge that at some point 
one will come to suffer from a genetic disease or the knowledge 
that one is at risk to have genetically impaired offspring are exam-
ples of the possible risks. These risks are magnified if the informa-
tion is likely to be a surprise, as when an individual learns of some 
incidental condition other than that for which testing was initially 
4. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDI-
TIONS 22-23 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]. 
5. [d. at 89. 
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undertaken. 
The risks of information are also magnified if the scientific 
validation of the diagnostic tool is still under study. Then there is 
some unknown likelihood that the information conveyed is inaccu-
rate. Genetic counselors report that experimental subjects want to 
know the results of work in progress. The standard approach, how-
ever, is not to make results known until the scientific accuracy of a 
diagnostic procedure is established. This is the approach taken for 
genetic research protocols submitted to the University of Utah's 
Institutional Review Board, for example.6 
Additional ethical problems arise if the genetic information 
has implications for other individuals, for example, an affected fe-
tus or other members of a family tree. The potential risks and ben-
efits for a fetus when parents are made aware of genetic diagnoses 
have been mentioned already. There are additional risks and bene-
fits for family members who otherwise may not know that they 
have the potential for serious, genetically linked disease. In some 
cases, such as multiple polyposis of the colon (a precursor of colon 
cancer), availability of the information may make possible lifesav-
ing early diagnosis. Yet tested individuals may have been assured 
confidentiality about test results? and may refuse to allow their rel-
atives to be informed from fear of stigmatization or for other rea-
sons. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine recommended'avoiding such situations when 
possible by insisting on disclosure of such potentially lifesaving in-
formation to relatives as a precondition of diagnostic testing itself. 
Recognizing that insistence on disclosure might discourage needed 
diagnosis or might simply not have been considered, however, the 
Commission also recommended guidelines for involuntary disclos-
ure in other cases by analogy to disclosure of communicable dis-
ease. These guidelines were that reasonable efforts to obtain con-
sent to disclosure had failed, that the probability is high that 
disclosure would avoid serious harm that would otherwise occur, 
and that precautions are taken to ensure disclosure only of the ge-
netic information needed for diagnosis and treatment. S 
6, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
(1985), 
7, In Utah, for example, medical records maintained by state institutions are classi-
fied as "private" data, available only to state agencies for appropriate uses, the individual 
himself, and others by the individual's express consent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-61(12} 
(Supp. 1985) and regulations. 
8. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 44. , 
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These guidelines were proposed for situations involving the 
use of nonexperimental techniques of genetic diagnosis. One of the 
hardest questions for genetics researchers, however, concerns 
whether information about experimentally tested subjects should 
be conveyed to other family members with important health inter-
ests. Researchers typically guarantee experimental subjects that 
identifying information about them will be kept confidential, and 
contacted subjects sometimes do not wish to have information 
about genetic risk conveyed to other family members. Indeed, the 
federal regulations governing research with human subjects require 
that experimenters inform subjects of their planned uses of data, 
and do not allow experimenters to make changes without the sub-
jects' consent.9 
These risks of information are perhaps most patent if we focus 
on the situation of an individual who is himself at risk of genetic 
disease. Identification of possessors of the Huntington's gene, for 
example, will relieve some and consign others to knowledge of their 
inevitable fates. The alternative would be to leave all members of a 
family in which Huntington's has appeared uncertain about their 
futures. Some may want to know; others will prefer the uncertain-
ties of ignorance to the possibility of knowing their eventual 
dooms. But whether an individual chooses to find out about his 
susceptibility to genetic disease is not a decision that will affect 
him alone. Partners, offspring, even employers have much at stake 
in an individual's decision to acquire or decline relevant informa-
tion about his or her genetic status. 
Identification of susceptibility to genetic disorders may be 
used to deny insurance benefits or to limit employment opportuni-
ties. Screening for genetic susceptibility to toxins, for example, has 
recently been implemented by several major employers.1o Concerns 
about the practice include questionable ways in which employers 
may use genetic information. For instance, such information may 
be used as a pretext for racial or sexual discrimination, or as a 
method to avoid remediating workplace conditions in favor of ex-
cluding hypersensitive workers. Genetic screening may provide em-
ployers with important information to improve workplace safety, 
however, and workers arguably have the right to be fully informed 
about potential hazards of their workplace environment, at least 
9. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) (1985). 
10. See, e.g., Genes and Jobs, 68 A.B.A. J. 1061, 1061 (1982). 
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some of which are surely individual.ll Ensuring the privacy and 
confidentiality of workers screened in such programs poses addi-
tional legal difficulties. 
C. Legal Responses 
There are several possible legal responses to these ethical di-
lemmas. This discussion focuses on two. First, regulatory ap-
proaches have been proposed to the performance of genetic testing 
or the use of genetic information. Second, tort law has been used 
as a means to shift losses associated with the performance (or non-
performance) of genetic testing and the use of information gained 
in testing. 
An example of the regulatory prohibition of genetic testing 
was the Food and Drug Administration's refusal to give market 
clearance until the summer of 1985 for blood test kits for diagnos-
ing neural tube defects. The concern was that test information 
would be misused because of inadequate facilities for followup 
testing. The marketed kit reveals only the need for further testing 
to rule out a neural tube defect; it does not show the clear presence 
of a defect. Individuals with positive results but inadequate 
followup might be led thereby to terminate pregnancies 
precipitously.12 
Regulatory approaches have also been proposed for the use of 
information obtained in genetic diagnosis. For example, in addition 
to its guidelines concerning involuntary disclosure of the results of 
genetic diagnosis to relatives, the President's Commission recom-
mended that information about genetic diagnosis be conveyed to 
employers or insurers only with the patient's consent. IS Very re-
cently, the suggestion has been made that genetic screening with 
11. See, e.g., Diamond, Genetic Testing in Employment Situations, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 
231, 247-54 (1983); Goodrich, Are Your Genes Right for Your Job?, 3 CAL. LAW., May 1983, 
at 24, 27-28; Sweltz, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: An Analysis of the Legal Implica-
tions, 19 FORUM 323, 325-26 (1984); Note, Getting Beyond Discrimination: A Regulatory 
Solution to the Problem of Fetal Hazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE L.J. 577, 577-79 
(1986). 
12. In the summer of 1985, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
reacted to the Food and Drug Administration's decision to grant market clearance for the 
screening kit. Their initial response was a legal recommendation that screening should now 
be part of the standard of care. The recommendation still stands, but the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has attempted to "retreat without retracting." Annas, Is 
a Genetic Screening Test Ready When the Lawyers Say It Is?, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 
Dec. 1985, at 16. 
13. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 42. 
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respect to toxic substances in the workplace be handled under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act rather than being regarded, as it 
largely has been, as a problem of sexual discrimination.I4 
A second legal approach with great potential for influencing 
the conduct of genetic diagnosis is loss shifting through tort liabil-
ity. In the past few years, a number of states have recognized tort 
law suits on the theory of wrongful hirth.IG A wrongful birth suit is 
brought by the child's parents, who contend that but for the negli-
gence of health care providers, their child would not have been 
born. Examples of such negligence include the failure to recognize 
the need for prenatal testing, the failure to inform parents of the 
availability of prenatal testing, or the careless perfor~ance of pre-
natal diagnosis. In the typical wrongful birth suit, the parents seek 
as damages the costs of raising the child whose birth would have 
been avoided. They may also seek recovery for their own pain and 
suffering resulting from the birth of the child. Although there is 
some division, courts are more likely to allow parents damages in 
situations involving the birth of an impaired child than in situa-
tions in which the birth of a healthy child follows practitioner neg-
ligence.I6 It is also more likely that parents will recover the costs of 
raising the child, which if the child is handicapped (as is common 
in these cases) may be quite high, than that the parents will re-
14. See Note, supra note 11, at 591-96. The most important advantage of an ap-
proach through the TSCA is that it allows the problem of reproductive hazard to be ap-
proached comprehensively in a manner which considers risks to both men and women. 
15. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 
339 (1982); Fassoulas v. Hanley, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 
253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513-14 
(1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Minn. 1977); Berman v. Allen, 
80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813, 
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Speck 
v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110, 113-14 (1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 
(Tex. 1975); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483, 488 (1983); Dumer v. 
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975). But see Azzolino v. 
Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1985) (claims for wrongful birth should not 
be judicially recognized absent a clear legislative mandate). 
16. Compare Smith v. Gore, No. CA-1006, slip OPe at 2 (Tenn. App. Jan. 28, 1986) 
(costs of rearing a normal, healthy child are not recoverable, but nothing in opinion pre-
cludes recovery of proximate damages not included in cost of rearing the child), Garrison v. 
Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5, 10 (Ind. 1985) (possible damages limited to those directly caused by 
unsuccessful sterilization and do not include costs of raising child nor exceptional expenses 
associated with child's defect), and Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (1982) (refusing to 
allow parents the costs of raising a healthy child) with Ochs v. Borrellia, 445 A.2d 883 
(Conn. 1982) (allowing parents the costs of raising a healthy child, offset by benefits from 
the child's existence). 
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cover for their own pain and suffering.17 
Some states have also recognized a cause of action for what is 
called wrongful life. This is a suit brought on behalf of the child 
claiming that it would not have been born alive but for practitioner 
negligence. IS The most common criticism of this cause of action is 
the difficulty of measuring damages. Courts rejecting wrongful life 
suits argue either that being born cannot be a wrong to a child, no 
matter what pain she suffers from her impairments, or that 
whatever these damages are they cannot be ascertained.19 The ex-
traordinary medical expenses associated with having a genetic de-
fect are measurable, however, and at least orie court has allowed a 
child to recover these damages, although not allowing recovery for 
the impaired existence itself.20 
The Utah Legislature recently added a new chapter to wrong-
ful birth and wrongful life litigation in the state. In 1983, 'the legis-
lature passed the Utah Wrongful Life Act.2l The Act's stated aim 
is "to encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other 
persons, regardless of age, condition or dependency, including all 
handicapped persons and all unborn persons."22 To this end, the 
Act specifies that no cause of action may arise in Utah based on 
the claim that but for the act or omission of another, a person 
would not have been born alive but would have been aborted.23 It 
also stipulates that failure to prevent a live birth shall not be con-
sidered in awarding damages in any action.24 
With one swoop, the Act abolishes both wrongful birth and 
17. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807, 813-14, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 
(1978). But see Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979) (allowing parents in a 
wrongful birth suit to recover). See generally Comment, The Legal Recognition of Medical 
Malpractice Tort Claims Based Upon Theories of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 15 
N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 274, 280 (1985) (noting the difficulty of calculating damages for the par-
ents' emotional pain and suffering as compared to presenting a verified list of medical 
expenditures). 
18. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 237-39, 643 P.2d 954, 965-66, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 337, 348·49 (1982); Curlender v. Bio Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 830, 
165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479 (1980); Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hosp., 134 lli. App. 2d 823, 
480 N.E.2d 1227, 1235 (1985); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (1984); Har-
beson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483, 493-95 (1983). 
19. See, e.g., Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (1984). 
20. Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hosp., 134 ill. App. 2d 823, 480 N.E.2d 1227, 
1235 (1985). • 
21. Act of March 10, 1983, 1983 Utah Laws 687 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-
11-23 to -25 (Supp. 1985). 
22. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 (Supp. 1985). 
23. Id. § 78-11-24. 
24. Id. § 78-11-25. 
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wrongful life as causes of action in Utah. The Act probably also 
means that negligent prescription of contraceptives cannot be con-
sidered in awarding damages. The Act does not, to be sure, rule 
out all damages from negligence with respect to genetic testing. 
For example, individuals could recover if failure to test had re-
sulted in the exacerbation of a genetic condition. But it does rule 
out one set of potentially large recoveries-those for the costs of 
raising a child who otherwise would not have been born-and it 
does this both in the case of couples who would have chosen to 
abort an affected fetus and in the case of couples who would have 
chosen not to conceive in the first place. The Act is thus far more 
than an anti-abortion statute, despite its announced right to life 
policy.25 
Utah is nearly unique in prohibiting wrongful birth ~d 
wrongful life suits by statute. Only South Dakota appears to have 
gone as far or farther than Utah in prohibiting such causes of ac-
tion. South Dakota prohibits actions or damage awards based on 
the claim that but for the conduct of another, a person would not 
have been conceived or would not have been permitted to have 
been born alive.26 Minnesota ties the prohibition of wrongful birth 
and wrongful life suits explicitly to efforts to discourage abortion. 
The Minnesota statute prohibits wrongful life or birth suits based 
on the claim that, but for the negligent acts of another, a person 
would have been aborted; it goes on to specify explicitly that 
[n]othing in this section shall be construed to preclude a cause of 
action for intentional or negligent malpractice or any other action 
arising in tort based on the failure of a contraceptive method or 
sterilization procedure or on a claim that but for the negligent con-
duct of another, tests or treatment would have been provided or 
would have been provided properly which would have made possible 
the prevention, cure, or amelioration of any disease, defect, defi-
ciency, or handicap; provided, however, that abortion shall not have 
been deemed to prevent, cure, or ameliorate any disease, defect, de-
ficiency, or handicap.27 
Illinois has announced by statute that it is state policy to protect 
the life of the unborn child from the moment of conception and 
that the permissibility in Illinois of abortions in cases in which the 
25. See Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Action 
and the Impact of Utah's Statutory Breakwater, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 833, 856-63. 
26. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-1 (Supp. 1984). 
27. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West Supp. 1986). 
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mother's life is not threatened is solely a function of decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court.28 This statute, however, has not 
been interpreted to prohibit wrongful life or wrongful birth suits in 
Illinois, based on the theory that an impaired fetus would have 
been aborted but for negligent medical advice.29 Finally, California 
has prohibited by statute suits by the child against its parents 
based on a theory of wrongful life. This does not prohibit actions, 
however, by parents or the child against negligent health care 
providers; indeed, California makes it clear that parental failure to 
prevent live birth shall not be considered as a defense or a limit on 
damage awards in any actions against third parties.30 
Regardless of views about the morality of abortion, I hope I 
have said enough about the complex risks and benefits of genetic 
diagnosis to suggest that the broad sweep of the Utah Act is ill-
advised. The Act has the potential to increase the risks of genetic 
diagnosis, far beyond achieving its primary goal of discouraging 
abortions.31 In effect, the Act removes a major set of malpractice 
incentives to inform people appropriately about the availability of 
genetic diagnosis, to perform genetic diagnosis carefully and to 
communicate information about the results of genetic diagnosis ac-
curately and understandably. 
28. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). 
29. Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hosp., 134 ill. App. 3d 823, 480 N.E.2d 1227, 
1232, 1234-35 (1985) (recognizing causes of action in illinois for wrongful birth and wrongful 
life). 
30. CAL. ClY. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982). 
31. A simple but major step would be to amend the statute to include only section 1. 
